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Watch enough late night television and you’ll see 
advertisements for weight-loss elixirs, hair restoratives, and cures for 
ailments you never dreamed existed. Imagine, if you will, yet another 
huckster, this one touting PrivateDeal, a “never-before-available 
investment opportunity, the chance of a lifetime! Get in on the ground 
floor of a start-up boasting triple-digit growth!” The PrivateDeal 
hawker goes on to declare: “This investment was previously only 
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available to the ultrarich, but now, thanks to recent developments in 
the law, it can be yours!” 
Jim, an intrigued investor, calls the 800 number on the bottom 
of his screen, expecting to encounter an operator ready to take his 
credit card information. Instead, he gets an agent who starts 
peppering him with questions about his income and net worth. 
Gradually it dawns on Jim that he may not be able to invest in 
PrivateDeal after all. Indeed, five minutes into the conversation, the 
agent confirms that he is not qualified to invest. 
“But. . .why. . .” Jim begins to splutter. 
“Sir,” the agent explains patiently—Jim senses she has started 
this speech many times already tonight—“The fine print in the ad 
specifies that only accredited investors are eligible to buy shares in 
PrivateDeal.” 
To which Jim responds: “Well, what’s an accredited investor?” 
Welcome to post-JOBS Act private investing.1 The JOBS Act 
revolutionized many aspects of securities law, and this piece will focus 
on one of them: the changes section 201 has wrought in the 
advertisement and sale of private securities. Before diving into the 
finer points of securities law, it is helpful to keep in mind the bottom-
line effect of those changes: companies once tightly constrained in 
terms of how they could seek money will soon be free to solicit funds 
from the general public. This development could mean that start-ups, 
large private companies, and hedge funds may soon be able to 
advertise on television, the Internet, and even billboards. 
The catch is that only those investors the companies 
reasonably believe to be “accredited” can actually buy shares. There 
are several categories of investors who qualify as accredited, but the 
one on which I’ll focus is the “natural person” category. This category 
includes individuals with an income of over $200,000 a year or a net 
worth of over $1 million.2 
I devote most of this essay to exploring how, exactly, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) should go about 
providing guidelines to implement the statutory requirement that 
issuers have a reasonable belief that a purchaser is accredited. The 
SEC has proposed rules, but these rules merely restate what Congress 
has already required, thus sidestepping Congress’s direction that the 
agency itself articulate some verification methods. Taking the SEC’s 
decidedly amorphous proposal to task, I recommend that the SEC 
offer two nonexclusive safe harbors for issuers to guide them in 
 
 1.  Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306. 
 2.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5), (6) (2013). 
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determining whether a natural person is an accredited investor. The 
paragraphs below will discuss the whys and wherefores of these safe 
harbors. 
I focus on the natural persons category because my hunch is 
that it is the most politically salient and controversial. Here is why: 
even if the SEC heeds my suggestion and identifies safe harbors, it 
will ignore the elephant in the room. The problem is that the JOBS 
Act gave companies a newfound ability to trumpet their investments 
to the world but simultaneously limited actual purchases to accredited 
investors. Hopeful investors like our hypothetical Jim will now hear 
about tantalizing investments they cannot make.3 As I have argued 
elsewhere, this difficulty may be grave enough to trigger a rethinking 
of the public/private distinction that currently underpins our 
securities laws.4 
I. WHERE WE ARE NOW 
Securities law requires companies to register the offer or sale of 
their shares with the SEC prior to sale, unless they can find an 
exemption from registration. Pre-JOBS Act, in order to qualify for an 
exemption under Rule 506 of Regulation D, issuers could not conduct a 
general solicitation or engage in general advertising when seeking to 
sell their shares. That meant they could not promote securities 
offerings by way of newspapers, magazines, TV or radio broadcast, or 
the Internet unless the website was password protected.5 
Under the old Rule 506, offerings in practice were generally 
limited to accredited investors,6 and an issuer needed a reasonable 
belief that a purchaser qualified as an accredited investor.7 Standards 
seemed lax. The watchword was “self-certification”—a prospective 
purchaser would merely sign a paper indicating that she qualified as 
 
 3.  A separate concern is that Jim might qualify as an accredited investor but lack the 
actual sophistication needed to evaluate private investment. By law, the SEC cannot revisit the 
actual definition of accredited investor status until 2014. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413, 124 Stat. 1376, 1577–78 (2010). 
 4.  See Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389 
(2013) (arguing that a disparity in investment access exists in which wealthy investors are 
allowed to choose between public and private investment markets, whereas less affluent 
investors are limited by securities regulations to the purchase of public securities). 
 5.  17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c). They also could not hold seminars if the attendees were invited 
by general solicitation. 
 6.  Although sales could be made to a limited number of unaccredited investors, most 
issuers did not do so in practice. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The 
Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC's Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BUS. LAW. 919, 931–
32 (2011). 
 7.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a). 
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an accredited investor. Importantly, however, in order to get a 
password to a website or to get on a list for solicitation in the first 
place, an offeree needed a preexisting substantive relationship with 
the issuer or broker establishing accredited investor status.8 In short, 
prior practice was for issuers to offer shares to a prescreened group, 
and then to take their word for it that they were in fact accredited. 
JOBS Act section 201 directs the SEC to lift the prohibition 
against general solicitation or general advertising, provided that “all 
purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.”9 In other words, 
issuers can market their securities broadly, so long as they target 
actual sales only at accredited investors. Of particular importance 
here, Congress directed the SEC to promulgate rules that “require the 
issuer to take reasonable steps to verify” that purchasers are indeed 
accredited, “using such methods as determined by the Commission.”10 
On August 29, 2012, the SEC proposed rules to implement 
section 201 of the JOBS Act.11 It basically punted on all of the big 
issues, proposing rules that satisfied almost no one. It introduced a 
new Rule 506(c), but preserved the old rule in Rule 506(b),12 thus 
allowing offerings without general solicitation, a move I think is all to 
the good. But the SEC did little else. It merely required (1) that the 
issuer take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers are accredited, 
(2) that they actually be accredited or that the issuer reasonably 
believe that are accredited, and (3) that the terms and conditions of 
Rule 501 and Rules 502 (a) and (d) are satisfied.13 
To be sure, the SEC proposed that whether the steps are 
reasonable would be an “objective determination, based on the 
particular facts and circumstances of each transaction.”14 It also 
described a number of factors relevant in the reasonableness 
determination, including (1) the nature of the purchaser, (2) the 
amount and type of information that the issuer has about the 
 
 8.  See E.F. Hutton & Co. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55680 (Dec. 3, 1985). 
 9.  Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 
313–14 (2012). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in 
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 77 Fed. Reg. 54464 (proposed Aug. 29, 2012) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239).  
 12.  Id. at 54466–67. Accordingly, issuers who do not wish to engage in general solicitation 
and its concomitant requirement for verification of accredited investor status before purchase 
can continue to conduct private offerings as before.  
 13.  Id. at 54467. These rules detail the specific categories of accredited investor, how to 
determine whether offerings are integrated, and procedures for restricting resale. 17 C.F.R. § 
230.501(a), § 230.502(a), (d). 
 14.  77 Fed. Reg. at 54467. 
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purchaser, and (3) the nature of the offering, including the manner of 
solicitation, its terms, and minimum investment amount.15 
I agree with the SEC that, given the range of categories of 
accredited investors,16 consideration of each transaction’s particular 
facts and circumstances is essential. Nevertheless, the SEC’s facts-
and-circumstances approach leaves much to be desired. The SEC 
should detail some nonexclusive safe harbors for issuers. As drafted, 
the rule creates pernicious uncertainty. Without any safe harbor in 
which to take shelter, well-meaning issuers must guess as to whether 
the Commission will later judge the steps they take to be “reasonable.” 
Lacking any guidance, the most prudent issuers may not undertake 
general solicitation, while only the most adventurous issuers will 
embark on the general advertising schemes that Congress envisioned 
as a new feature of private securities offerings. 
II. THE RISKS 
There are three basic concerns about lifting the ban on general 
solicitation. First, there is the risk that fraudulent issuers will take 
investors’ money and run. The second danger is that some purported 
issuers may not even be looking for investment dollars at all. Personal 
information is valuable, financial information more valuable, and 
financial information of millionaires and high-wage earners more 
valuable still. Finally, some investment schemes are legitimate but 
foolhardy, helmed by honest but misguided managers and doomed to 
fail. 
Only the first two concerns matter for our purposes. As to the 
last, separating fraudulent investment schemes from foolish ones is 
the age-old problem of investing, and the SEC will not find a 
mechanism to solve it. Requiring additional disclosure of issuers 
might make sense, but the Act does not authorize this approach and 
indeed, given its emphasis on eliminating barriers to private-firm 
capital raising, it is questionable whether such requirements are 
permissible. 
In contrast, fraud and privacy concerns are real. Unscrupulous 
individuals have always preyed on the financial hopes of Americans, 
and allowing private companies to advertise to the general public will 
only magnify the potential sphere of fraud. There is no perfect solution 
 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  This includes everyone from brokers or dealers registered under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, to Internal Revenue Code 501(c)(3) companies, to sufficiently wealthy 
natural persons. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1), (3). 
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to this problem, but adding a simple registration requirement to a 
well-constructed safe-harbor regime would reduce the chances that 
fraudulent programs will succeed. As to the second danger, privacy 
concerns militate against requiring issuers to collect personal 
information up front. Any specific safe harbors we contemplate must 
address these twin risks. 
III. THE PRACTICAL QUESTION: WHAT IS AN ACCREDITED INVESTOR? 
There are two ways for an individual who is not affiliated with 
the issuer to qualify as an accredited investor: income and net worth.17 
Income is the more straightforward benchmark, although the SEC has 
proposed a questionable metric for gauging it. Net worth, in contrast, 
is inherently slippery and poses real problems in measurement. 
 The income path to accredited investor status—more than 
$200,000 in annual income for an individual or $300,000 for a married 
couple (in each case, for each of the last two years)18—seems easy to 
verify. The key question concerns who should obtain this proof and 
how, but the concept of ascertaining income level is relatively simple. 
W-2s or K-1s reporting income from the past two years, plus some type 
of assurance of the prospect for comparable income in the year of 
investment, should suffice. 
The SEC has suggested in its proposed rules that “publicly 
available information in filings with a federal, state or local regulatory 
body,” such as a named executive officer whose salary is disclosed in 
periodic Exchange Act filings, would also suffice.19 For example, a 
company’s 10-K might specify that its CEO made $400,000 last year 
and the year prior. The SEC is on firm ground here because this 
information pertains to specific, named individuals. Companies 
registering with the SEC affirm the truth of this information and face 
liability for false assertions. 
The SEC ventured into more questionable territory when it 
further opined that there may be a reasonable belief that an 
individual purchaser has attained the annual-income thresholds 
where the purchaser “works in a field where industry or trade 
publications disclose average annual compensation for certain levels of 
employees or partners, and specific information about the average 
compensation earned at the purchaser’s workplace by persons at the 
 
 17.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5), (6). 
 18.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6). 
 19.  77 Fed. Reg. at 54468. 
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level of the purchaser’s seniority is publicly available.”20 This method 
is more questionable because it relies heavily on generalized 
information untethered to particular individuals. Firm practices can 
vary widely, and individuals of a given rank may have disparate 
salaries. In short, there is too much guesswork for there to be a 
reliable assessment of accredited investor status here. 
The second path to accredited investor status, having a net 
worth in excess of $1 million (excluding the value of the primary 
residence),21 is much trickier. The difficulty is that an investor can 
disclose assets but fail to disclose liabilities, thus painting a falsely 
rosy picture of her finances. Use of third-party verifiers cannot resolve 
this problem. For example, even if a financial advisor certifies that a 
prospective investor has $1 million in assets under management with 
him, that same investor may have $2 million in liabilities elsewhere of 
which the advisor is completely ignorant. 
Companies that wrestled with the task of determining 
accredited statuses under the old regime struggled with this same 
problem. As the general counsel of SecondMarket, Annemarie Tierney, 
observed, objects such as art or jewelry could legitimately count as 
assets, and yet are extremely hard to value.22 Tierney’s suggestion is 
to forge a proxy for net worth status by using a high minimum 
investment threshold. This cure, however, may prove worse than the 
disease, as I will discuss below. 
IV. ADVICE TO THE SEC: WHAT SHOULD THE SAFE HARBORS BE? 
The SEC has evinced an inexplicable reluctance to articulate 
safe harbors under section 201. It has indicated that requiring specific 
methods of verification would be “impractical and potentially 
ineffective in light of the numerous ways in which a purchaser can 
qualify as an accredited investor” as well as overly burdensome and 
ineffective.23 So far so good—the SEC’s reasoning makes sense with 
respect to avoiding rigid, one-size-fits-all requirements. 
Problematically, however, the SEC has refused to provide a 
“nonexclusive list of specified methods”—i.e., safe harbors—for 
establishing reasonable efforts to determine accredited status. It has 
 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5). 
 22.  Letter from Annemarie Tierney, SecondMarket, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n (May 25, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-
16.pdf. 
 23.  77 Fed. Reg. at 54470. This conclusion despite Congress’s direction to determine 
methods for issuers to use in verifying accredited investor status. 
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explained this decision by reasoning that (1) in some instances the 
information might not actually verify accredited investor status and 
(2) the information might be viewed as necessary in all 
circumstances.24 
These concerns are unfounded. As to the first, the SEC could 
limit its safe harbors to areas where accredited investor status is an 
all-but-sure thing—for example, by insisting on the use of W-2 forms 
and eschewing a safe harbor based only on average wages. As to the 
second, issuers are familiar with what a safe harbor means and have 
demonstrated the ability to understand and apply the rules in this 
very arena.25 
Potential safe harbors include self-certification, use of a third- 
party verifier, having the issuer obtain documentation of accredited 
investor status, and having a minimum investment threshold. We will 
take each in turn.  
A. Self-Certification 
Self-certification—under which a potential investor would 
merely have to affirm her accredited status in a statement—would be 
a disaster. The subprime mortgage crisis is a painful reminder of how 
willing people are to fudge their finances in order to qualify for “can’t-
lose” investment opportunities and how problematic such behavior can 
prove for the larger economy. 
Proponents of self-certification point to the fact that issuers 
currently use this method with relatively few problems.26 But the 
current world of private investment is not one of general solicitation. 
Purchasers under today’s Rule 506 need to be affirmatively and 
individually solicited, and such solicitation must take place via means 
such as a password-protected site. In a world where tightly controlled 
prescreening is a key comfort, relying on attestation of accredited 
status at a later stage makes sense. 
General solicitation, however, is a brave new world–one where 
issuers will be free to advertise via radio and the Internet. At least 
 
 24.  Id. at 54471. 
 25.  Indeed, Rule 506 itself constitutes but one safe harbor under Section 4(2) of the 
Securities Act. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a). My proposals would thus create new safe harbors within 
an existing safe harbor. 
 26.  See, e.g., Letter from Marianne Hudson, Exec. Dir., Angel Capital Ass’n, to Elizabeth 
M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 11, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov 
/comments/s7-07-12/s70712-198.pdf (“The existing form has worked well for a generation of 
startups funded by accredited investors using Rule 506(b), . . . a simple solution that involves 
adding a few questions to the existing accredited investor questionnaire to clearly meet the 
‘reasonable assurance’ intent of the JOBS Act.”). 
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some subset of gullible investors would be willing to swear to high 
heaven that they have the requisite means to get in on the “next big 
thing.” The SEC has acknowledged the difference between soliciting a 
prescreened database of accredited investors and creating a website 
accessible to the general public.27 It has—and wisely so—opined that 
in the latter case self-certification will not be enough. I would go even 
further and formally enshrine use of only a particular form of self-
certification as a first safe harbor. In my view, when the issuer has a 
reasonable belief that a prescreening mechanism has effectively 
filtered out all but accredited investors, self-certification via 
questionnaire or a simple form should be enough to qualify. 
Otherwise, it should not. 
B. Third-Party Verifier 
The SEC should provide a second safe harbor built around the 
idea that issuers can often obtain reliable assurances of an investor’s 
accredited status from a third-party verifier. One attraction of a 
method focused on the provision of information to third parties is that 
it would decrease the risk of identity theft. Rather than handing over 
sensitive information to dubious issuers, investors would submit 
documentation to third parties. Of course, nothing would prevent 
spurious third-party verifiers from cropping up, so the best course 
would be to grant verifying power only to individuals licensed by 
federal or state government or professional organizations. Obvious 
candidates for such a role include broker-dealers, lawyers, financial 
advisors, and CPAs. 
One downside to such a move is that it could create a cottage 
industry of verifiers, slowing down and increasing costs in private 
investment, and thus contravening the goals of the Act. Nevertheless, 
real costs might be minimal; indeed, broadly authorizing professionals 
to provide this service will, at least in theory, drive costs down. In 
addition, most accredited investors already use at least one of these 
professionals and may already submit personal financial information 
to them. Involving third-party verifiers might also provide benefits in 
some cases by allowing experts to steer vulnerable clients away from 
fraudulent or unduly risky ventures. 
The type of information that a third-party verifier would need 
to review is another question. As observed above, determining an 
investor’s income is usually simple. In many cases, however, net worth 
is difficult, since it entails “proving a negative”—that is, proving that 
 
 27.  77 Fed. Reg. at 54469.  
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the investor lacks undisclosed liabilities. The only solution I can come 
up with is a combination of third-party verification of $1 million in 
assets, coupled with the investor signing an attestation that all 
liabilities have been disclosed. That attestation should be made under 
penalty of perjury, with the investor waiving any claims to rescission 
or other recourse against the issuer should the assertions prove to be 
materially false. 
C. Issuer Verification 
At first blush, having issuers themselves obtain paperwork 
from would-be buyers might seem to be a logical way to provide a safe 
harbor. Upon reflection, I believe the risk of identity theft—especially 
in light of the sensitive nature of the financial information disclosed—
is too great to encourage this form of information gathering. Investors 
need a way of separating legitimate issuers from scammers who 
merely want them for their W-2s. 
Attempts to address this concern would likely stretch the SEC’s 
scarce resources too thin. For example, the SEC could provide some 
type of preregistration to issuers, obtaining enough information to 
ascertain that they are not simply trolling for information. The idea 
would be that an investor would hear an advertisement, then call the 
SEC or visit a website to ensure that the investment is legitimate 
before handing over social security numbers and the like. But the SEC 
would not only have to devote countless hours to reviewing and 
assessing potential issuers, but also have to educate investors about 
their ability to investigate companies before revealing personal 
information. Providing effective education of this sort would present 
major difficulties, especially because the target audience by definition 
includes many unsophisticated or unwary would-be investors. There is 
another reason why the SEC might not want to get into the business 
of certifying issuers as “genuine.” At best it could lend a false air of 
safety to inherently risky investments; at worst, it would set up the 
SEC to be a scapegoat whenever an agency-certified issuer goes south. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that an issuer might not 
obtain documentation from an investor and point to it as creating a 
reasonable belief that the investor was accredited. But I would not 
enshrine such a method in a safe harbor because of the above 
concerns. 
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D. Minimum Investment Threshold 
SecondMarket’s Annemarie Tierney suggests a minimum 
investment threshold as another safe harbor, and indeed several other 
commentators have echoed this idea, suggesting everything from 
$25,00028 to $500,000.29 The SEC has found merit in this view, stating 
that the ability to satisfy a “sufficiently high” minimum investment 
amount without financing by the issuer or a third party would be a 
positive factor in verifying accredited investor status.30 
This approach, however, seems like a recipe for disaster 
because it would encourage movement away from just the sort of 
diversification strategy that is the key to sound investing. One 
problem is that it will be difficult to ascertain that a purchase is not 
being financed. Even more problematic is that hopeful investors who 
do not meet minimum thresholds will be motivated to, in essence, 
abandon all prudent investing strategy and, instead of diversifying, 
bet a significant portion of their net worth on a single investment. 
Take, for example, a widow who is interested in an extremely 
risky hedge fund. Her husband’s life insurance proceeds have netted 
her $400,000 in cash, she owns her house, and she lives on social 
security benefits. She is interested in a hedge fund that has a 
$250,000 minimum investment requirement. While she can scare up 
the requisite money without needing financing, few would believe that 
such an investment would be prudent. Relying on a high minimum 
threshold here seems to incentivize risky behavior without offering 
any real assurance of qualifying net worth. 
The same problem exists for investors who just barely meet the 
$1 million net worth threshold. Creating a safe harbor based on a 
minimum investment amount would imply it is perfectly reasonable 
for these individuals to invest twenty percent or more of their net 
worth in inherently illiquid and risky assets. Worse yet, focusing 
regulatory attention on minimum investment levels may also cause 
issuers to create higher net worth thresholds than they otherwise 
would put in place—thus breeding inefficiencies and constricting the 
range of investment opportunities Congress wanted to create. For all 
of these reasons, the SEC should not endorse any investment-amount 
 
 28.  Letter from Daniel R. Hansen, Partner, Montgomery & Hansen, LLP, to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 15, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/ 
s7-07-12/s70712-136.pdf. 
 29.  Letter from Stuart J. Kaswell, Exec. Vice President & Managing Dir., Gen. Counsel, 
Managed Funds Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 28, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-12/s70712-79.pdf. 
 30.  77 Fed. Reg. at 54469, n.54. 
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safe harbor. Indeed, the risks in this area are sufficiently great that 
the SEC should abandon its consideration of minimum investment 
amounts as a relevant factor entirely. 
V. A FINAL, ACROSS-THE-BOARD REQUIREMENT: PRE-OFFERING FILING 
WITH THE SEC 
Some subset of issuers will always be out to fleece investors. 
General advertisement may not greatly increase the number of 
fraudulent issuers, but it will broaden the universe of potential fraud 
victims and include in that universe a new group of investors more 
susceptible to deception and more subject to harm than is the case 
under current law. The best the SEC can do is to require issuers in all 
cases to file with the SEC ahead of any general solicitation, ideally 
obtaining enough information from principals so that there is a way to 
track down wrongdoers. 
The most effective mechanism would be to require an issuer to 
file a Form D as a precondition for exemption and to do so before it 
engages in any general advertising. Form D details basic information 
on the issuer’s identity, principal place of business, contact 
information, and details of the offering.31 Current rules require a 
Form D filing, but it need only be made after the first purchase.32 
Requiring a presolicitation filing would slow down quick-hitting, too-
good-to-be-true offerings; deter some fraud; and make it easier for 
investors to track down wrongdoers. While it is true that the SEC 
would have to devote additional resources to this effort, the payoff 
should be worth it. Additionally, we would obtain far more data on 
private issuers’ use of these exemptions, a goal worth pursuing in any 
event. 
CONCLUSION 
The SEC has yet to issue final rules governing how exactly, in 
a new era of general solicitation, issuers should go about obtaining a 
reasonable belief that purchasers are accredited. I urge it to establish 
some safe harbors for issuers: (1) self-certification coupled with a 
prescreening mechanism and (2) verification by a reputable third 
party such as a broker-dealer, lawyer, financial advisor, or CPA. I 
 
 31.  See http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf. 
 32.  17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a)(1) (2013); Brian R. Buckham, Private Placements of Securities in 
a New Era of Regulation and Enforcement – Traps for the Unwary, ADVOCATE, Sept. 2011, at 34, 
36, available at http://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/advocate/issues/adv11sep.pdf (explaining that Form D is 
required to be filed within fifteen days after the first sale of securities). 
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would take no account of the size of an investment in drawing 
conclusions about a purchaser’s net worth, and I would require pre-
offering filing with the SEC. 
I will end with a suggestion borrowed from the crowdfunding 
portion of the JOBS Act. Crowdfunding allows average investors to 
invest up to five percent of their income or net worth in private 
investments.33 We have already seen how slippery the concept of net 
worth can be. Perhaps, at least where investors are qualifying on the 
basis of net worth, the SEC can require issuers to limit individuals’ 
investments in private offerings to no more than five percent of their 
net worth. So, for example, a widower with $1 million would be able to 
invest no more than $50,000 in private investments, and a third-party 
verifier would have to attest that he had been advised of such a limit 
and believed that he complied with it. To require such diversification, 
after all, would do nothing more than require a potentially non-
sophisticated investor to act with basic prudence. 
At the least, limits like these might help reduce the 
frustrations of Jim, our hypothetical late-night caller, by limiting the 
amount of special investments to which accredited investors have 
access. More generally, lifting the ban on general solicitation will 
inevitably cause greater awareness of the fact that we live in a world 
of investing haves and have-nots.34 Perhaps in time a fuller 
recognition of the costs and inequalities brought about by our 
accredited-investor-based regulatory regime will lead to its rethinking. 
We must wait and see. 
 
 
 33.  Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(6)(B)(i) (West Supp. 
2012). Wealthier investors, or those with higher incomes are allowed to invest up to ten percent 
of their annual income or net worth. Id. § 77d(6)(B)(ii). 
 34.  In a recent real world example, the private equity firm Carlyle Group recently opened a 
fund with a minimum investment of $50,000—an offering open only to accredited investors. 
Ryan Dezember, Carlyle Group Lowers Velvet Rope, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2013), http://online.wsj 
.com/article/SB10001424127887324096404578356700271878018.html. 
